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Abstract— We consider a two-player zero-sum network rout-
ing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount
of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node
to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as
much legitimate traffic as possible by flooding the network
with malicious traffic. We address scenarios with asymmetric
information, in which the router must reveal its policy before
the attacker decides how to distribute the malicious traffic
among the network links, which is naturally modeled by the
notion of Stackelberg equilibria. The paper focuses on parallel
networks, and includes three main contributions: we show that
computing the optimal attack policy against a given routing
policy is an NP-hard problem; we establish conditions under
which the Stackelberg equilibria lead to no regret; and we
provide a metric that can be used to quantify how uncertainty
about the attacker’s capabilities limits the router’s performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses a network routing game between a
player that wants to route legitimate traffic from a source
node to a destination node and another player that wants to
block traffic by flooding the network with malicious traffic.
We refer to these players as the router and the attacker.
Motivated by network security problems, we are interested
in scenarios of asymmetric information, where the router
exposes its policy to the attacker before the attacker needs
to select its policy. The problem formulation considered
here is motivated by the so-called Crossfire attack in which
an attacker persistently degrades network connectivity by
targeting a selected set of links within the network, while
adjusting to changes in routing policies [1]. The defense
against such attacks has been the subject of recent work [2],
[3], [4], [5].
The Nash equilibrium is an attractive solution concept
for noncooperative games because it leads to very strong
notions of equilibria, in that neither player regrets its choice
after the outcome of the game is revealed [6]. However,
such equilibria often do not exist in problems of asymmetric
information. The Stackelberg equilibrium is an alternative
solution concept where one player (the leader) must select
and reveal its policy before the other player (the follower)
makes a decision [7]. This type of equilibrium specifically
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addresses the information asymmetry that we consider here
and has been applied to domains closely related to the
problem considered in this paper, including network routing
[8], scheduling [9], and channel allocation for cognitive
radios [10], but also has application in supply chain and
marketing channels [11] among other fields. The Stackelberg
equilibrium is a concept that is also well-suited for security
of critical infrastructure systems [12] and has been applied to
surveillance problems that include the ARMOR program at
the Los Angeles International Airport [13], the IRIS program
used by the US Federal Air Marshals [14], power grid
security [15], and defending oil reserves [12]. These two
types of equilibria have also been studied extensively for
various types of security games [16].
This paper includes three main contributions:
1) Theorem 1 establishes that computing the attacker’s
optimal response to a routing policy is an NP-hard
problem.
2) Theorem 2 determines conditions on the network under
which Stackelberg equilibria lead to no-regret policies
(i.e., are also Nash).
3) Section IV explores how uncertainty in knowledge
about the capabilities of the attacker translates into
performance loss for the router. Theorem 3 provides
a closed-form expression which quantifies this for a
two-link network.
We focus on a network consisting solely of N parallel
links that directly connect source and destination. Even
within this simple set of networks, the computation of the op-
timal attack policy turns out to have higher complexity than
one might expect. For any fixed routing policy, we show in
Section III that the computation of the “optimal” distribution
of a fixed budget of attack traffic among the parallel links
is an NP-hard problem with respect to the scaling parameter
N . From the attacker’s perspective, “optimal” means that the
attacker can prevent as much traffic as possible from reaching
the destination, by flooding network links so that legitimate
traffic in excess the links’ capacity is dropped.
As noted above, Nash equilibria have the desirable feature
that they lead to no regret by both players, a feature that is
generally not shared by Stackelberg equilibria. It turns out
that in the network routing games considered here, Stack-
elberg equilibria only lead to no-regret (i.e., are also Nash
equilibria) in the extreme cases where the attacker controls
a very large or a very small amount of traffic. We show this
to be true for parallel networks in Section IV. For these two
extreme cases, we actually provide explicit formulas for the
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optimal Stackelberg/Nash routing policies. Not surprisingly
in view of the NP-hardness result, no explicit formulas are
provided for intermediate levels of attack traffic.
Motivated by the nontrivial dependence of the Stackelberg
policy on the total amount of traffic ra controlled by the
attacker, we also study how uncertainty in ra affects routing
performance. Previous work in this area has modeled this
type of uncertainty as a distribution over the possible values
of ra, giving rise to routing policies that give an optimal
expected value on the cost function [17]. However, in this
work, we define a metric for the “value of information” about
the power of the attacker that compares the amount of traffic
that the attacker could block if the router knew precisely ra
versus the amount of traffic it could block if the router had
to select a policy without precise knowledge of ra. The latter
scenario generally leads to an increase in blocked traffic. We
show in Section V a closed-form expression for the value of
information in two-link networks.
II. MODEL
This paper focuses on a two-player network routing game
where the system operator is tasked with deriving a routing
policy to maximize the throughput of a given single source /
single destination parallel network in the presence of an
adversary. The network is comprised of a set of edges E,
where each edge e ∈ E is associated with a given capacity
ce ≥ 0. The system operator, which we will henceforth
refer to as the router, is tasked with with designing a
routing profile f = {fe}e∈E which routes r ≥ 0 units of
traffic across this network. A feasible routing profile satisfies∑
e∈E fe = r and 0 ≤ fe ≤ ce for all edges e ∈ E. We
denote the convex set of all admissible routing profiles as
F(c, r) where c = {ce}e∈E denotes the capacities of all
edges.
This work considers the existence of an attacker whose
goal is to block as much routed traffic as possible by reducing
the capacities of the edges in the network through a cross-fire
style attack where the attacker can send up to ra ≥ 0 units of
non-responsive traffic on various edges in the network. An
adversarial attack can be characterized by a routing profile
fa = {fae }e∈E which satisfies
∑
e∈E f
a
e = r
a and 0 ≤ fae ≤
ce for all edges e ∈ E. We denote the set of all admissible
adversarial attack policies as Fa(c, ra). We will often refer to
ra as the attack budget of the adversary. Given an admissible
routing profile f ∈ F(c, r) and an adversarial attack fa ∈
Fa(c, ra), the amount of legitimate traffic blocked on any
edge e ∈ E is defined as
Be(f, f
a, c) := max {fe + fae − ce, 0} , (1)
and the total blocked traffic in the system as B(f, fa, c) =∑
e∈E Be(f, f
a, c). Since the routing policy is non-
responsive, the adversarial choice effectively reduces the
capacity on each edge e from ce to ce − fae . Lastly, we
will often omit highlighting the functional dependence on the
parameters c, r, and ra for brevity, e.g., express Fa(c, ra)
as merely Fa, when this dependence is clear.
One focus of this paper is to characterize different forms
of equilibria in this two-player network routing game. In
general, we will assume that a router is required to choose
the routing strategy first and the adversary can respond
accordingly. The most natural class of equilibria that captures
this phenomena is that of Stackelberg equilibria (SE), which
consists of any pair of routing profiles (f, fa) such that
f ∈ arg inf
f¯∈F
sup
f¯a∈Fa
B(f¯ , f¯a, c), (2)
fa ∈ arg sup
f¯a∈Fa
B(f, f¯a, c). (3)
If fa satisfies (3), we refer to fa as a best response attack
to f . A second class of equilibria that we focus on is Nash
equilibria (NE), which focuses on situations where both the
router and adversary are required to select their strategy
without knowledge of the other’s choice. A NE is defined
as any pair of profiles (f, fa) such that
f ∈ arg inf
f¯∈F
B(f¯ , fa, c), (4)
fa ∈ arg sup
f¯a∈Fa
B(f, f¯a, c). (5)
We refer to SE(r, ra) as the set of all SE for values
r, ra, and likewise NE(r, ra) for NE. Note that given the
definitions above,NE(r, ra) ⊆ SE(r, ra). In the event where
NE(r, ra) = SE(r, ra), this implies that the router is not
strategically disadvantaged by having to reveal its choice
before the adversary selects its policy. However, while a
SE will always exist, the same does not hold true for NE.
Furthermore, this paper will address how knowledge of the
exact value of ra impacts the existence and efficacy of such
equilibria.
Example 1: We begin with the following example high-
lighting the complexity of computing NE and SE in such
a routing game. To that end, consider the example shown
in Figure 1a with r = 25 and ra = 20 and denote the
edge set as E = {1, 2, . . . , 5} and edge capacities as c =
{2, 4, 9, 12, 20}. Given a routing profile f = {1, 1, 5, 10, 8}
and an attack profile fa = {2, 4, 4, 4, 6}, it follows from
(1) that the traffic blocked on each edge is 1, 1, 0, 2
and 0, respectively. Note that these strategy profiles (f, fa)
neither capture a NE or SE as there are numerous adversarial
strategies that could increase the total blocked traffic given
the routing profile f , e.g., f¯a = {0, 0, 8, 12, 0}.
The plot in Figure 1b highlights the distinction between
NE and SE for the considered routing problem for all pairs
(r, ra) satisfying 47 ≥ r, ra ≥ 0. For instance, when r = 20
and ra = 5 (see point P1 in Figure 1b), any SE is also a NE.
One such routing profile is f = {0, 0, 0, 5, 15}, as this does
not allow the attacker to block any traffic. When r = 25
and ra = 45 (point P3), we see a similar phenomenon,
where the attacker has much more power. In fact, observe
that the routing profile f = {2, 4, 6.3¯, 6.3¯, 6.3¯} and attack
profile fa = {0, 4, 9, 12, 20} constitute both a SE and NE.
The router is able to design a policy such that the attacker
can only block
∑
e∈E ce− ra traffic, the best the router can
achieve given ra. Thus the router has no incentive to deviate,
𝑐" = 2𝑐% = 4𝑐' = 9𝑐) = 12𝑐+ = 20
𝑠 𝑡
(a) An example network. Suppose that f = {1, 1, 5, 10, 8} and
fa = {2, 4, 4, 4, 6}. Then, for instance on edge 4, since the
capacity is 12, 2 units of traffic are blocked. In total we see that
B1 = 1, B2 = 1, B3 = 0, B4 = 2, and B5 = 0, which results in
B(f, fa, c) = 4.
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(b) This figure showcases one of the contributions of this paper:
a characterization of where no NE exist (gray region) and when
all SE are also NE (white regions) for the network in (a). For any
values (r, ra), one of those two properties must hold. See Example
1 and Theorem 2 for more details.
Fig. 1: An example network showcasing the model and
regions of (r, ra) where NE exist.
and clearly the attacker cannot. Lastly, when r = 30 and
ra = 20 (point P2) we begin to notice a discrepancy between
NE and SE in the sense that given any profiles (f, fa), if (5)
is satisfied then (4) is not satisfied. For example, consider the
profiles f = {1.4, 4, 6.4, 6.4, 11.8} and fa = {0, 0, 0, 0, 20}
and note that fa satisfies (5). If the attacker implements this
policy, then (f, fa) is not a NE, since the router would
benefit unilaterally by moving some traffic from edge 5
to another unblocked edge. The forthcoming Theorem 2
provides the characterization shown in Figure 1b.
III. PROBLEM HARDNESS
In this section, we show that finding the best response
attack policy in (3) is NP-Hard. We formally define it as
follows:
Problem 1: Given a parallel network with edges E, corre-
sponding capacities c, a routing policy f , and attack power
ra, find fa which satisfies (3), i.e., a best response attack
policy.
Note that an instance of the problem can be defined
by (E, c, f, ra), and we show how the complexity of the
problem scales with the number of edges in the parallel
network.
Theorem 1: Problem 1 in NP-Hard on the scaling variable
|E|.
The theorem is proved by reducing the 0-1 Knapsack
Problem (KP), a known NP-Hard problem, to Problem 1.
We do this by showing that if all fe are “sufficiently small”,
then any best response attack must either block all traffic on
an edge or block none of it. Thus finding the best response
attack is simply finding the set of edges to fully block,
corresponding to the discrete nature of the items in the 0-1
KP. This implies any method for solving these instances of
Problem 1 will also solve the 0-1 KP.
The following lemma defines “sufficiently small” in this
context:
Lemma 1: Consider an instance of Problem 1
(E, c, f, ra), where
fe < min
E′⊆E:ra−C(E′)>0
ra − C(E′), (6)
for some e ∈ E. Then Be(f, fa) ∈ {0, fe} for any fa which
is a solution to Problem 1.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive statement. Let e be
such that Be(f, fa) /∈ {0, fe}. Define Eblock := {e′ ∈ E :
fe′ + f
a
e′ > ce}, and observe by definition that e ∈ Eblock.
Then it must be true that fe > ra − C(Eblock \ {e}) > 0,
otherwise the attacker could block more routed traffic by
redistributing as much attack traffic as possible from e to
the other edges in Eblock. Therefore, (6) must be false.
Given this, we proceed with the proof of Theorem 1. The
0-1 KP can be defined as follows: assume we have n items,
where each item e has a cost we and a value ve. Given a
total cost constraint W , find the combination of items with
maximum total which does not exceed W . More formally
stated, determine
maximize
x
∑
e
vexe
subject to
∑
i
xe, we ≤W, xe ∈ {0, 1},
(7)
where x := [xe]. This problem is known to be NP-Hard in
the number of items [18].
Mapping a 0-1 KP to Problem 1 can be done with the
following method: let every item be mapped to an edge in
a parallel network, ra = W , ce = we, and fe = εve, where
ε > 0 satisfies
εve < min
E′⊆E:ra−C(E′)>0
ra − C(E′), (8)
for all e ∈ E. By Lemma 1, we know that any solution to
this subset of instances of Problem 1 has the property that
every edge will either have all routed traffic blocked or none.
Therefore, the problem can be reformulated as
maximize
x
∑
e
fexe
subject to
∑
i
xece ≤ ra, xe ∈ {0, 1}.
(9)
This problem yields an equivalent solution to that in (7),
since the constraints are the same, and each objective func-
tion is a scaled version of the other. Thus solving this
instance of Problem 1 will also solve 0-1 KP and shows
that Problem 1 is NP-Hard. 
IV. EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we present results that describe precisely
the relationship between SE and NE in our model. For some
E′ ⊆ E, we denote it’s total capacity as C(E′) := ∑e∈E′ ce.
Theorem 2: Consider a parallel network with capacities c,
routing demand r, and adversarial routing power ra. The set
of Nash Equilibria NE(r, ra) is nonempty and NE(r, ra) =
SE(r, ra) if and only if one of the following is satisfied: 1
ra ≤ max
E′⊆E
C(E′)− r
|E′| (10)
ra ≥ C(E)− max
E′⊆E
r − C(E \ E′)
|E′| . (11)
Proof: Note that since B(f, fa) =
∑
e max{fe+fae −
ce, 0}, then a lower bound on B(f, fa) is
B(f, fa) ≥ r + ra − C(E). (12)
We now begin with a few observations about router best
responses:
1) For a policy pair (f, fa), if fe + fae ≤ ce for all e,
then B(f, fa) = 0, and the router has no incentive to
deviate. If fa satisfies (5), then (f, fa) is both a SE
and a NE.
2) For a policy pair (f, fa), if fe + fae ≥ ce for all e,
then B(f, fa) = r + ra − C(E), the lower bound in
(12). Thus the router has no incentive to deviate. If fa
also satisfies (5), then (f, fa) is both a SE and a NE.
3) For a policy pair (f, fa), if there exist e, e′ ∈ E such
that fe + fae > ce and fe′ + f
a
e′ < ce′ , then (4) is not
satisfied. Therefore, (f, fa) is not a NE.
We now proceed with proving Theorem 2. To that end,
consider the routing policy f lo, where
f loe := max
{
ce − max
E′⊆E
C(E′)− r
|E′| , 0
}
. (13)
We first show that f lo is feasible. Let E∗ be the largest set
in arg maxE′⊆E(C(E
′)− r)/|E′|. Then e ∈ E∗ if and only
if
C(E∗)− r
|E∗| ≥
C(E∗ \ {e})− r
|E∗ \ {e}| . (14)
=
C(E∗)− ce − r
|E∗| − 1 =⇒ (15)
ce ≥C(E
∗)− r
|E∗| , (16)
1While finding the maxima in (10) and (11) may appear to be compu-
tationally intractable given the number of edges in the network, it is true
that the maximizing E′ for both (10) and (11) is of the form {1, 2, . . . , k
}, where the edges are ordered starting with highest capacity to the lowest.
Therefore, finding either maxima is equivalent to finding the best value of
k, which can be completed in linear time.
where we define r/0 =∞. Since this is true, it follows that∑
e∈E
f loe =
∑
e∈E∗
f loe , (17)
=
∑
e∈E∗
ce − C(E
∗)− r
|E∗| , (18)
=C(E∗)− |E∗|C(E
∗)− r
|E∗| = r, (19)
thus f lo is feasible.
Note that if ra satisfies (10), then for any allowable attack
fa, f loe + f
a
e ≤ ce for all e. Hence by observation 1, (f, fa)
is a SE and a NE. Since B(f, fa) = 0 must hold for any
SE, we conclude that SE(r, ra) = NE(r, ra).
We now turn our attention the case in (11). To this end,
consider the routing policy fhi, where
fhie := min
{
ce, max
E′⊆E
r − C(E \ E′)
|E′|
}
. (20)
This policy is feasible, which can be shown using a similar
argument as that given above for the feasibility of f lo. If ra
satisfies (11), then for any allowable attack fa, fhie +f
a
e ≥ ce
for all e. By observation 2, (fhi, fa) is a SE and a NE. Since
B(f, fa) = r + ra − C(E) for any SE, we conclude that
NE(r, ra) = SE(r, ra).
Suppose that ra does not satisfy (10). Let f ∈ F(c, r) and
denote Eflow = {e : fe > 0}. Then
ra > max
E′⊆E
C(E′)− r
|E′| ≥
C(Efull)− r
|Efull| ≥ mine∈Efull ce − fe.
(21)
Here we have omitted some of the algebra to allow for space
constraints. If e′ minimizes the expression in the righthand
side of (21), then there exists an fa such that fe′+fae′ > ce′ .
Since B(f, fa) > 0, it must be true that for any SE (f, fa),
there must be an edge e where fe + fae > ce.
Suppose that ra does not satisfy (11). Let f ∈ F(c, r) and
denote Epart = {e : fe < ce}. Then
ra <C(E)− max
E′⊆E
r − C(E ⊆ E′)
|E′| ≤ C(E)− mine∈Epart fe,
(22)
where again we have omitted the algebra for the sake of
space. If e′ minimizes the rightmost expression in (22), then
there must exist an attack policy fa where fe′ + fae′ < ce′ .
Since B(f, fa) > r + ra + c, it must be true that for any
SE (f, fa), there must be an edge e where fe + fae < ce.
Therefore, by observation 3 we conclude that when ra
satisfies neither (10) nor (11), no NE can exist.
Refer again to the network in Figure 1. At point P1, r = 20
and ra = 5. Here we calculate maxE′⊆E(C(E′)−r)/|E′| =
7, which means that ra satisfies (10). Thus the router can use
the policy f lo = {0, 0, 2, 5, 13} to ensure that the attacker
cannot block any traffic. By Theorem 2, this also implies that
(f, fa) is both a SE and a NE for any fa ∈ Fa(c, r). At
point P3, r = 25 and ra = 45. Here we calculate C(E) −
maxE′⊆E(r − C(E \ E′))/|E′| = 40.6¯, which means that
𝑡𝑠 𝑚
𝑐% = 2
𝑐( = 4 𝑐*,… , 𝑐%- = 1
Fig. 2: Two parallel networks in series. We use this example
to illustrate the complexities for finding SE and NE in more
general networks than just parallel. For instance, one cannot
simply decompose the optimal attack problem into either
attacking the set of edges between s and m, and attacking
the edges between m and t. Even if we limited our scope
to such attacks, which set of edges to attack depends on the
value of ra, not merely on f and c. See Example 2 for more
details.
ra satisfies (11). Thus the router can use the policy f =
{2, 4, 6.3¯, 6.3¯, 6.3¯}, and from Theorem 2, (f, fa) is a NE and
SE for any fa ∈ Fa(c, r). At point P2, r = 30 and ra = 20.
We calculate that maxE′⊆E(C(E′) − r)/|E′| = 3.75 and
C(E)−maxE′⊆E(r − C(E \ E′))/|E′| = 59, therefore ra
does not satisfy (10) or (11). By Theorem 2, we know that
no NE can exist at this point.
Example 2: Consider now the example in Figure 2, a
graph where two parallel networks are connected in series.
We present this as a simple example to showcase the com-
plexities that arise when studying the SE of non-parallel
networks. For more complex networks, one might think that
finding a best response attack could be limited to attacking
a minimal cut-set in the network. However, even in this very
simple example, we show that this isn’t the case, and in
fact, a best response attack will often incorporate edges of
multiple cut-sets in the network. Thus investigating parallel
networks in this paper gives a natural simplification of the
problem in order to address the questions of interest.
In Figure 2, denote Esm as the cut-set of edges between
s and m and Emt as the cut-set of edges between m and
t. Observe that regardless of the attacker’s capability, there
always exists a SE route where all edges in Emt have the
same amount of traffic routed on them. We assume in the
following cases that the router always uses such a policy,
and therefore, we need only focus on the routing strategy
across Esm.
Let r = 2 and ra = 5. If the attacker restricts its attacks
to a single cut-set Esm or Emt, then the router can choose
its policy accordingly, for instance fe = 1 for e ∈ Esm,
and fe = 0.25 for e ∈ Emt. Note that across each cut-set,
this route satisfies (2). Attacking only Esm, the attacker can
block 1 unit of traffic, but attacking only Emt, the attacker
can block 1.25 units of traffic. This may seem unintuitive,
since the total capacity of Esm is less than that of Emt.
Furthermore, the best response for the attacker is to block
some traffic on Esm and some on Emt. For instance, the
attacker could block the 1 unit of traffic on edge 1, and then
block all traffic on 3 of the edges in Emt. Assuming that
the router evenly distributes the remaining 1 unit of routed
traffic that arrives at node m, this attack would block 1.375
units of traffic. Therefore, solving for a SE must include all
attacks across multiple cut-sets.
Given these complexities with even very simple non-
parallel networks, the characterizations of SE and NE in
Theorem 2 only apply to parallel networks. While this class
of networks is sufficiently rich to ask the questions and
showcase the phenomena that are relevant to this work, future
work can ask similar questions in a broader setting.
V. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
In this section, we present preliminary results about the
value to the router of knowing information about the attack
power ra. In order to do this, we introduce some notation.
We define
B∗(f, ra) := B(f, fa), (23)
where fa ∈ Fa(ra) satisfies (3). In other words, B∗(f, ra)
measures how much traffic is blocked in the attacker’s best
response to f , given ra. We also define
BSE(r, ra) := B(f, fa), (24)
where (f, fa) ∈ F(r)×Fa(ra) is a SE. Recall that for the
pair (r, ra) the same amount of traffic will be blocked by
any SE (f, fa).
As an example of both these functions, consider the plot in
Figure 3 for a three-link parallel network where c = {2, 3, 5}
and r = 5. For the fixed route f = {0.5, 2, 3.5}, the gray
line represents how B∗(f, ra) changes as a function of ra.
Likewise, the orange line showcases BSE(r, ra) as a function
of ra. Observe that B∗(f, ra) ≥ BSE(r, ra) for all values of
ra.
A. Limited information
We limit the router’s knowledge of ra by stating that the
router only knows that ra is in some interval pia = [pia, pia].
In light of this uncertainty, if the router chooses policy f ,
then we can define the risk of f on interval pia as
R(f, pia) := max
ra∈pia
(
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(r, ra)) . (25)
Intuitively, the value B∗(f, ra)−BSE(r, ra) represents how
much more traffic the attacker is able to block because the
router chose policy f instead of a SE policy for that value of
ra. Thus the risk R(f, pia) is the maximum such value across
all ra ∈ pia. In other words, this measurement of risk shows,
in the worst case, the advantage that the attacker gains by
the router not knowing the true value of ra.
As an example, consider again the plot in Figure 3. If
we assume that the router has no knowledge of ra (i.e.,
pia = [0, 10]), then the risk associated with the route f =
{0.5, 2, 3.5} is the maximum difference between the gray
and orange lines, which is achieved at ra = 8. Therefore, in
this case we see that R(f, pia) = 1.5.
It turns out that the maximization in (25) can be restricted
to a finite set of points in pia.
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Fig. 3: A plot showing the amount of traffic blocked by
an optimal attack for a SE routing policy (orange) versus
the traffic blocked when the router selects specific routing
policy f (regardless of the value of ra). Here c = {2, 3, 5},
and r = 5. The fixed policy represented by the gray line is
f = {0.5, 2, 3.5}. We show the values of the risk R(f, pia)
for pia = [0, 10].
Lemma 2: For a parallel network,
R(f, pia) = max
ra∈(α∩pia)∪{pia,pia}
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra), (26)
where α is the finite set {ra : ∃E′ ⊆ E where ra = C(E′)},
which has at most 2|E| elements.
The full proof is given in Appendix-A, however here we
provide some intuition: consider the plot in Figure 3. The
orange line, BSE(r, ra), is piecewise linear, with no line
slope being greater than 1. The grey line, B∗(f, ra), is also a
piecewise linear function, with lines slopes either 0 or 1. The
value of the risk R(f, pia) is incurred at ra = C({2, 3}) = 8,
where the attacker’s best response against f is to fully block
edges 2 and 3. Because the two lines are piecewise linear,
the largest distance must take place at one of the points of
discontinuity for the gray line inside the interval pia.
Finally, we define the value of information to the router
for an interval pia as the minimum amount of risk that can
be incurred for any routing policy. More formally stated,
V (pia) := min
f∈F
R(f, pia) (27)
= min
f∈F
max
ra∈pia
(
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(r, ra)) (28)
We also denote the routing policy which minimizes (27)
by fpi . This value of information is meant to reflect how
valuable (i.e., how much less traffic would be blocked) if
the router knew the exact value of ra. For instance, if
V (pia) = 0, then there exists a route which satisfies (2) for
any value of ra ∈ pia, thus the router does not need to know
the exact value. However, when V (pia) is high, knowing ra
would allow the router to ensure that less traffic is blocked.
Figure 4 shows V (pia) and fpi for a two-link network.
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Fig. 4: A plot with an example two-link parallel network
that shows a graphical interpretation for V (pia). The edge
capacities in the network are {3, 6}, and r = 5. The orange
line represents how much traffic is blocked at the SE for
each value of ra, and the gray line is how much is blocked
by a best response attack against fpi = {2, 3} for each value
of ra. The interval pia = [4, 7] is the blue shaded region.
The value of information V (pia) is the maximum difference
between the two lines within the blue region.
B. The Value of Information in Two-Link Networks
Lemma 2 provides a numerical procedure to compute the
risk for a routing policy f against an attack power interval
pia for general parallel networks. For two-link networks, this
means there exists a closed-form solution for R(f, pia) and
subsequently V (pia).
Theorem 3: Consider a two-link parallel network, where
c1 ≤ c2. Suppose that the router only knows that ra ∈ pia =
[pia, pia]. Then the value of information is
V (pir) =
{
0, if pia ∩ [c1, c2] 6= ∅
1
4 (min{pia, c2} −max{pia, c1}), otherwise.
(29)
Before proving the theorem, we first give an example to
provide some intuition. Consider the plot in Figure 4. In
this network, c = {3, 6}, and r = 5. If the router knows
the exact value of ra, it can choose a SE routing policy,
which will make the difference between the lines 0 at that
value of ra. If we assume that the router only knows that
ra ∈ pia = [4, 7], then it must choose a policy to mitigate the
risk associated with that loss of information. In this scenario,
the router’s best option is to use fpi = {2, 3} (gray line),
which minimizes the maximum difference between the two
lines on pia. The value of the routing knowing ra is then this
minimum maximum difference, i.e., V (pia) = 0.5.
To prove Theorem 3, we first show that we need only
consider two attacks as best response.
Lemma 3: Consider a two-link network. For any f ,
B∗(f, ra) = max
fa∈{fa1(ra),fa2(ra)}
B(f, fa), (30)
where
fa1(ra) := {min{ra, c1},max{ra − c1, 0}}, (31)
fa2(ra) := {max{ra − c2, 0},min{ra, c2}}. (32)
In other words, there always exists a best response attack
policy where either (1) the attacker puts as much attack
traffic as possible on edge 1 and the reminder on edge 2
(i.e., fa1(ra)); or (2) vice versa (i.e., fa2(ra)).
Proof: Let fa be a best response attack policy to f .
If B(f, fa) = 0, then the lemma is trivially true. Therefore,
let e be an edge where Be(f, fa) > 0, then one can create a
new attack policy fˆa by redistributing as much attack traffic
as possible from the other edge e′ to e. Let this amount
be δ, so fˆae = f
a
e + δ. Then Be(f, fˆ
a) = Be(f, f
a) + δ
and Be′(f, fˆa) ≥ Be′(f, fa) − δ. This implies B(f, fˆa) ≥
B(f, fa), which is at equality since fa is a best response.
Since fˆa ∈ {fa1, fa2}, we conclude the proof.
Lemma 3 allows us to only consider two attack policies
when solving for the best response, but it also gives us a
simple way to solve for a SE. In the two-link case, f is a
SE routing policy if
f ∈ arg min
f∈F
max{B(f, fa1(ra)), B(f, fa2(ra))}. (33)
Observe that if B(f, fa1(ra)) = B(f, fa2(ra)) then f sat-
isfies (33), since moving traffic between the edges can only
increase B(f, fa1(ra)) or B(f, fa2(ra)). We will leverage
this observation to find BSE(r, ra) in the following proof.
Now we prove Theorem 3, beginning with the case when
pia∩ [c1, c2] = ∅. First let ra < c2, and denote g as the value
of the maximization in (10). When ra ≤ g, we know from the
proof of Theorem 2 that B∗(f lo, ra) = BSE(ra) = 0. When
g < ra < c1, then B(f lo, fa1(ra)) = B(f lo, fa2(ra)) =
ra−g, therefore by the observation above, rlo is a SE routing
policy, and B∗(f lo, ra) = BSE(ra).
We now let ra > c2 - the other possible scenario when
pia ∩ [c1, c2] = ∅. Here we denote h as the value of the
maximization in (11). When ra ≥ C(E)−h, we know from
the proof of Theorem 2 that B∗(fhi, ra) = BSE(ra) = r +
ra−C(E). When c1 < ra < h, then Theorem 2 also informs
that there must always be an edge e where Be = 0, in the
two-link case, one edge is fully blocked and the other has no
routed traffic blocked. It follows then that B(fhi, fa1(ra)) =
B(fhi, fa2(ra)) = h, and fhi is a SE routing policy. We
conclude that when pia ∩ [c1, c2] = ∅, then V (pia) = 0.
For the remainder of the proof, we consider the case where
pia ∩ [c1, c2] is nonempty. We leverage the following lemma
which simplifies the expression for B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra).
Lemma 4: For a two-link network, if ra ∈ [c1, c2], then
for any f ,
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra) = |f1 − (r,+ra − c2)/2| (34)
Proof: When ra ∈ [c1, c2], then we know from Lemma
3 that for any f ,
B∗(f, ra) = max{B(f, fa1(ra), B(f, fa2(ra))} (35)
= max{f1, r − f1 + ra − c2} (36)
From the observation made above, a SE routing policy is
therefore one where f1 = r− f1 + ra − c2, i.e., f such that
f1 = (r + r
a − c2)/2, f2 = (r − ra + c2)/2 (37)
satisfies (33). It follows then for any f that
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra) = max{f1, r − f1 + ra − c2}
− (r + ra − c2)/2, (38)
= |f1 − (r + ra − c2)/2|. (39)
As argued in the proof of Lemma 2, pia need not be
included in the maximization in (26) if pia ≤ c1 and pia
need not be included if pia ≥ c2. Therefore, our calculation
of V (pia) can be further simplified:
V (pia) = min
f∈F
max{B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra),
B∗(f, ra)−BSE(ra)}, (40)
= min
f∈F
max{|f1 − (r + ra − c2)/2|,
|f1 − (r + ra − c2)/2|}, (41)
where ra := max{c1, pia} and ra := min{c2, pia}. This
implies that the minimizing value of f1 in (41) is halfway
between (r + ra − c2)/2 and (r + ra − c2)/2, i.e.,
f1 = (2r + r
a + ra − 2c2)/4, (42)
which implies that V (pia) = (ra − ra)/4. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a particular set of network
routing games, wherein the attacker has full knowledge of
the router policy before choosing its own policy. We showed
that choosing such a best response attack policy is an NP-
Hard problem over the class of parallel networks. We showed
that in such networks, a SE policy is also a NE policy when
the attack either doesn’t have enough attack power to affect
anything, or where the attacker can block nearly everything.
We concluded with a study on two-link networks and how
the router’s uncertainty of the attack power can affect how
much traffic is blocked. We also gave a method for designing
routing policies to be as robust as possible against such
uncertainty.
Future work will focus on expanding this value of informa-
tion study first to parallel networks, and then to the set of all
networks. Another path is to understand, when the routing
policy is not centralized, but distributed, how each router
can be incentivized to use local information to determine
the proper routing policy.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof for Lemma 2
Fix r and f ∈ F(r). Since all parameters except ra are
fixed, we use the notation B∗(ra) and BSE(ra) to emphasize
that we are considering how much traffic is blocked as ra
varies.
To prove this lemma, we claim the following to be true:
1) B∗(ra) is a continuous function.
2) Suppose ra is such that there exists a best response fa
and e ∈ E where ce−fe ≤ fae < ce. Then there exists
ε > 0 such that
B∗(ra + δ)−B∗(ra)
δ
= 1 for all 0 < δ < ε. (43)
Otherwise, if no such fa, e exist, then there is ε > 0
such that
B∗(ra + δ)−B∗(ra)
δ
= 0 for all 0 < δ < ε. (44)
In words, ra is the lower boundary of a neighborhood
where the derivative of B∗(ra) is 1 for all points in the
neighborhood or 0 for all points in the neighborhood.
3) If there exists ε > 0 such that
B∗(ra + δ)−B∗(ra)
δ
= 0, and (45)
B∗(ra)−B∗(ra − δ)
δ
= 1, (46)
for all 0 < δ ≤ ε, then ra ∈ α.
4) On a plot of BSE(ra) vs ra, the slope of the line
between any two points is in the interval [0, 1].
Assuming the claims are true, claims 1 and 2 imply that
B∗(ra) is a continuous piecewise linear function, where the
slope of each line is either 1 or 0. By claim 4, B∗(ra) −
BSE(ra) is increasing when the slope of B∗(ra) is 1, and
decreasing when the slope of B∗(ra) is 0. Therefore, the
max of B∗(ra)− BSE(ra) must occur at some value of ra
where the slope of B∗(ra) changes from 1 to 0. By claim 3,
all such values of ra are contained in α. In the case where
α \ pia is nonempty, we include the boundary points pia and
pia as possible values where the max on the interval pia can
occur.
Now we prove each of the claims. First we show that
B∗(ra) is continuous. Observe that when ra increases (de-
creases) by ε > 0, B∗(ra) can increase (decrease) by no
more than ε. More formally,
|ra − rˆa| < ε =⇒ |B∗(ra)−B∗(rˆa)| < ε, (47)
and thus the function is continuous.
To show Claim 2, suppose that ra is such that there exists
a best response attack fa where ce−fe ≤ fae < ce for some
e ∈ E. Increasing ra (and fae ) by δ allows the attacker to
increase B(f, fa) by δ. Therefore, B∗(ra+δ) = B∗(ra)+δ,
which implies (43).
Now suppose that ra is such that no such fa, e exist, i.e.,
that for any best response attack policy fa and for all e ∈ E,
either
fae = ce or (48)
fae < ce − fe, (49)
If δ is small enough so that (49) can be replaced with fae <
ce−fe− δ, then increasing ra by δ cannot increase B∗(ra).
This implies (44).
To prove claim 3, we state an implication of claim 2: if
(45) is satisfied, then no best response fa, e exist where
ce − fe ≤ fae < ce. However, (46) implies that ra is also an
upper boundary of a neighborhood where such an fa and e
exist. The only both statements can be true is if fae ∈ {0, ce}
for all e and for all optimal fa. This implies that ra = C(E′)
for some E′ ⊆ E, i.e., that ra ∈ pia.
We now prove claim 4. The function BSE(ra) must be
nondecreasing, since any attack policy that can be imple-
mented with low ra can also be carried out with high ra.
Equation (47) shows that the slope of the line between any
two points on BSE(ra) is ≤ 1, so we conclude that the claim
holds. 
